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1. Introduction
In 1992 Tversky and Kahneman [47] introduced Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), which conjugated sign-dependence
with rank-dependent utility, and solved the violation of stochastic dominance that occurred in their Prospect Theory [18].
In CPT prospects or lotteries were defined in terms of gains and losses with respect to a (neutral) reference point and the
decision-maker (DM) had asymmetric risk attitude, generally risk aversion with respect to gains and risk seeking with
respect to losses.
Major drawbacks have been put in evidence in representation of gain-loss asymmetry through CPT. Gains and losses are
definedwith respect to a certain and unique reference point (endowment or status quo). Distortion of probabilities, obtained
through a probability weighting function attached cumulatively to outcomes, were used to maximize the overall value of a
prospect, but a lottery with finite expected valuemay have infinite subjective value (St. Petersburg paradox) given a concave
value function in gains [41], or the DMmay consider very high probability events as certain [1,21,48].
In recent years the critical assumption of unique and certain reference point has been relaxed to cope with some real
observed phenomena such as buying insurance or selling stocks. Therefore new versions of CPT, which generalize the
reference-dependent subjective expected utility by introducing reference point as lotteries [26,46] ormore simply recogniz-
ing the possible use of multiple reference points in judgments [6,33], have been introduced. Incoherence and inconsistency
observed in choice involving extreme events have been explained by suggesting different weighting functions [40,49], as-
suming the existence of a positive (contingent) recency effect, such as oversensitivity to recent outcomes [2], or more
radically concluding that the DM is not an utility maximizer of some generalized expectation [33]. 1
We introduce a new version of CPT under ambiguity, by involving a rank among outcomes and disregarding any consid-
eration about preferences. This allows to connect the existence of a reference set with the human behavior facing extreme
outcomes. Experimental evidence and field studies [20,42] put in evidence that people has ambiguity aversion (pessimism)
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1 In the Russian roulette problem, Li et al. [33] determined that did not exist a measure of people’s willingness to pay for a reduction of the probability of death
(one bullet) compatible with nonlinear, asymmetric or U-shaped weighting function.
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when face catastrophic losses (i.e. the US production of one thousand solid-fueled Minuteman missiles because of the sup-
posed favourable ICBM gap of URSS in the ’60 and the pandemic human swine flu) and ambiguity seeking (optimism) with
respect to the windfall gains (i.e. discovery of a new drug active against an incurable disease). Under ambiguity or epistemic
indeterminancy, the DM does not face a known (reliable) probability distribution but attaches more than one subjective
probability distribution over possible events [17]. In this framework, ambiguity is modeled through a set of probability dis-
tributions (multiple priors) in the core of a convex nonadditive probability or capacity. 2 The set of priors reflects the DM’s
assessment of the epistemic reliability (weight of evidence) of available information about the underlying uncertainty or
creedal state and allows to represent the DM’s attitude about it. In fact, "an additional advantage of cumulative prospect
theory as compared to original prospect theory is that it can be also applied to uncertainty, i.e., the case in which probability
of events are not given" [10, p. 137].
We introduce a formalization of CPT under ambiguity that relies on the idea that the DM has a set of outcomes called
ordinary (familiar), because they are considered more reliable and closer to her experienced life, and two tails that include
more uncertain and extreme (unfamiliar) events. As a result, our representation is coherent with ’discontinuity in the DM’s
preferences on prospects’ resulting from action of "simple psychological categories like relief from fear of high losses or
hopelessness due to unlikeness of high gain [that] may be experienced in a rather jumpy manner" [51]. The new represen-
tation permits to elicit a rank among prospects, which takes into account fat-tailed events, usually misvalued in standard
approaches, due to cognitive insensitivity to small probability outcomes [11]. The new decision rule is less conservative with
respect to formulations basedona convex combinationofmaxmin andmaxmaxapproaches,which induce anoverevaluation
of extreme events and an underevaluation of ordinary events. In fact, the DM is supposed to be pessimistic with respect to
purely catastrophic losses, ambiguity neutral on ordinary outcomes and optimistic with respect to purely windfall gains. 3
In addition, our representation is consistent with the recent experimental literature on CPT that shows the existence of a
positive correlation of the DM’s attitude about extreme outcomes and competence effect [14].
On ordinary outcomes, the DM adopts diversification, an intuitive and consistent strategy for reducing likely loss, for
deriving an appropriate probability distribution among the set of multiple priors. Since entropy reflects the diversification
degree of a portfolio [50], the DM makes use of the Maximum Entropy Principle to elicit that probability distribution. 4
Maximum entropy probability, which is ameasure of conflict of evidence, can be considered ameasure of the diversification
degree and a rational form of prudence.
Because of tractability and theoretical soundness, we define the value function of a prospect as the Choquet integral of
an appropriate quantile function. While such a formula already exists in the literature [15], we propose a simpler direct
expression, by which we obtain an inverse cumulative function that is summation of three different Choquet integrals and
provides ’discontinuity in preferences’. The composite value function of a prospect has a very attractive characteristic: it is
a platykurtic function. In fact, it is the flattest (least peaked) in the interval of ordinary outcomes, through maximization of
entropy among all ones in the DM’s probability set, it has the fattest (the most divergent) loss tail among all ones, since it
maximizes the minimum expected value in the interval of unfamiliar losses and it has the fattest (the most divergent) gain
tail among all ones, since it maximizes the maximum expected value in the interval of unfamiliar gains.
The paper is organized as follows: related literature and preliminaries are in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the composite
value functionofaprospectbyaquantile function. Section4characterizesanoperationalnotionof thePrecautionaryPrinciple
able to represent the impact of catastrophic events on human communities. Section 5 shows a very simple application of
the new decisional rule to an asset portfolio problem. Section 6 illustrates the case where the DM’s ambiguity attitude is
characterized through E-contamination of confidence. Here a priori information leads to the closest to uniformity probability
distribution P0, but cautiousness forces the DM to envision an E-contamination υ of P0. Finally, we define a simpler approach
where the DM’s prior P0 is only considered a credible probability even if not fully reliable, and the parameter E is the value
that captures the confidence in the DM’s assessment or the error in P0. Concluding remarks follow.
2. Related literature and preliminaries
It is straightforward to observe that extreme intervals of losses and gains call to mind a class of decision making models
that assume security and potential factors in the determination of the DM’s choices. Security level (SL) and potential level
(PL) in preferences were introduced to accommodate generalized versions of expected utility theory and Allais paradoxes
[13,18,29,35]. Jaffray’s model [29] induced an explanation of risk aversion by the certainty effect, in fact risk neutral decision
makers at a given SL were necessarily risk averter, since they "never consider as favorable mean-preserving spreads of their
probability distributions on the outcome set" [29, p. 195]. Gilboa [18] axiomatized an increasing function of the expected
2 Choquet [12] defined the notion of capacity or charge and Schmeidler [44] axiomatized Choquet expected utility to represent the DM’s preferences under
ambiguity. Gilboa and Schmeidler [19] suggested a cognitive interpretation of Choquet expected utility (CEU) with respect to a convex capacity by which the
DM evaluated a lottery by computing the expected utility with respect to each possible probability in the core of the capacity and chose the minimal one. This
interpretation allows to consider an application of CEU with respect to a convex capacity as an application of a multiple prior approach.
3 Basili et al. [3,4] found out characterizations of the DM’s behavior when she had ambiguity attitude with respect to catastrophic losses or windfall gains and
ambiguity neutrality with respect to a set of ordinary outcomes.
4 TheMaximum Entropy Principlewas introduced by Jaynes [27,28] to elicit the most unbiased or the most uniform distribution among all the possible ones in
physics as a generalization of the classical principle of Laplace’s Insufficient Reason.
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utility and the minimum utility (worst consequence with positive probability). Lopes [35] introduced a SL–PL framework
modeled by a decumulatively weighted value rule for both gains and losses. Cohen [13] elaborated an axiomatic model
for a DM who took into account "simultaneously or alternatively the security factor and the potential factor". However,
experimental literature and field studies put in evidence systematic violation of SL–PL models, "since SL–PL models reduce
to expected utility preferences in the interior of theMarschak–Machina triangle, typical violations of expected utility theory
elicited in the interior of the Marschak–Machina triangle cannot be accommodated by the original SL–PL models" [45, p.
279]. To improve the descriptive power of SL–PL models Schmidt and Zimper [45] rejected the assumption that the DM
referred exclusively to the worst and the best outcome in a prospect, regardless of how small their were, and axiomatized
thresholds in outcomes, so that "security or potential considerations become only relevant when the probabilities of bad,
respectively, good, outcomes are not below some perceptual threshold level. Extreme outcomes with probabilities beyond
these thresholds will be disregarded" [45, p. 280]. As a consequence in SL–PL models with thresholds levels, "good or
bad outcomes with probabilities beyond these thresholds are ignored for the calculation of utility" [45, p. 280]. Crucially,
empirical observations suggest that the DM does not ignore extreme outcomes but has a different attitude with respect to
them [14,16,32].
In our approach theDMexplicitly considers extreme outcomes in the set of catastrophic losses andwindfall gains, but she
has a different attitudewith respect to them. In fact, the definition of the set of ordinary outcomes depends on outcomes and
probabilities that determine the lower and upper tails in each prospect (unfamiliar outcomes). We obtain that, the quantile
that includes ordinary outcomes, resembles a confidence interval, which is a measure of the variability degree of what the
DM considers an ordinary outcome (more reliable and closer to experienced outcomes).
Let S be the set of states of the world andA a σ -algebra of events whereA is a subset of 2S , such thatA= 2S if S is finite.
We consider a DM facing ambiguity modeled through a set of probability distributions in the core C(υ) of a convex capacity
υ on A, i.e. C(υ) := {P ∈ P : P(A) ≥ υ(A) ∀A ∈ A}.
We confine our model to (S, 2S) where S is finite, since a finite setting allows us to lean Jaffray’s results [30], as follow:
the DM elicits the particular probability denoted π ∈ C(υ) that maximizes the entropy, in the set of ordinary outcomes.
The probability π is the closest to uniformity and dominates any other probabilities in C(υ) for Lorenz ordering [36].
That way for any given act X : S→R and (α, β)∈ [0, 1]2 , α ≤ β , such that [α, β] determines the interval of cumulative
probability betweenwhich outcomes can be considered as ordinary, we assume that theDMvalues outcomes between these
two quantiles in an ambiguity neutral way by π . We furthermore model pessimism in the lower tail [0, α] , i.e., model the
attitude of the DM who minimizes the expectation of X on this quantile with respect to all P ∈ C(υ), and symmetrically
optimism in the upper tail [β, 1], throughmaximization of the expectation of X in this quantile with respect to all P in C(υ).
A Quantile Utility Model (QUM) is used in decision theory byMansky [37] and axiomatized by Rostek [43], who provided
a characterization in a Savage setting. In a risky set-up, a QUM can be summarized as follows: given a probability measure
on themeasurable space of outcomes and a fixed number γ ∈ (0, 1), the DM orders feasible alternatives with respect to the
highest γ th -quantile of the induced cumulative probability distribution over outcomes. Given a lottery, the DM is assumed
to maximize a fixed quantile of the utility probability distribution over outcomes and if γ = 0 or γ = 1, the optimal
choice induced by the standard maxmin or maxmax decisional rule is obtained, respectively. Crucially and unsurprisingly,
this decisional rule has a clear limit in discriminating among probability distributions, since the DM evaluates only a lottery
by the fixed γ th -quantile realization, i.e., a single statistic, whereas she is not interested in what happens in a probability
distribution outside the γ th -quantile, producing in such a way very large classes of indifference.
In this paper we extend QUM to more than one quantile through the interval of cumulative probability [α, β]. In a finite
setting, that can be generalized to an infinite setting, we develop a simple quantile function suited for the computation
of the composite value function of a prospect in term of lower tail, middle and upper tail outcomes. Our composite value
function is monotone, constant additive and positively homogeneous, so it makes possible to rank all alternative lotteries,
preventing any incomparability and a large indifference class. It is worth emphasizing that Kiefer [23,24] proposed an
incentive compatiblemethod toelicit quantiles and introducedamaximumentropyapproachwhen theassessed information
consistedof quantiles for calculatingminimumcapital requirements provided for banks to assess credit andother risks (Basel
II, B2 framework).
3. Choquet integral and quantile-functions
Let P be a probability on (S, 2S). For X : S → R, the cumulative distribution function FX of X is defined by x ∈ R →
FX(x) = P(X ≤ x). 5
A common pseudo-inverse of FX denoted the quantile-function F
−1
X is defined
6 by p ∈ [0, 1] → F−1X (p) =
Inf
{
x ∈ R, FX(x) ≥ p
}
, one gets F
−1
X (0) = −∞, F−1X (1) = Maxs∈S X(s), F−1X is non-decreasing and left-continuous. Ac-
cordingly, it is enough to know F
−1
X on (0, 1) to be completely informed on F
−1
X .
Let us also recall that ∀X ∈ RS , the mathematical expectation of X w.r.t. P, EP(X) is equal to∫ 10 F−1X (p)dp.
5 To avoid confusion, it will be often useful here to write FPX instead of FX .
6 To avoid confusion, it will be often useful here to write FP
−1
X instead of F
−1
X .
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We now come to the Choquet integral. First we recollect some definitions.
Definition 1. υ is a capacity on (S,A) if υ : A ∈ A → υ(A) ∈ R, where υ(∅) = 0, υ(S) = 1 and such that, (A, B) ∈ A2,
A ⊆ B 	⇒ υ(A) ≤ υ(B).
Definition 2 (Choquet integral). Let X ∈ RS and υ a capacity on A, the Choquet integral of X w.r.t. υ denoted ∫ X dυ is
defined by
∫
X dυ = ∫ 0−∞(υ(X ≥ t) − 1)dt +
∫+∞
0 υ(X ≥ t)dt.
We intend now to introduce suitable definitions of the cumulative distribution and quantile-function of an act X with
respect to a capacity υ .
Let us recall:
Definition 3. The dual capacity υ of a capacity υ is defined by υ(A) = 1 − υ(AC) ∀A ∈ A.
We now introduce the following new definitions.
Definition 4. The cumulative distribution FυX of X with respect to capacity υ is defined by x ∈ R → FυX (x) = υ(X ≤ x).
The reader might be surprised that FυX (x) would not be defined by υ(X ≤ x); but this definition is in accordance with
the probabilistic case since if υ equals a probability P then FυX (x) = 1 − P(X > x) = P(X ≤ x) = FPX (x). The fact that we
do not choose FυX (x) defined by υ(X ≤ x) but by υ(X ≤ x) will be clear in the sequel, when defining the pseudo-inverse of
FυX and using it as in the probabilistic case for retrieving the Choquet integral.
Definition 5. Define the quantile function Fυ
−1
X by p ∈ [0, 1] → Fυ−1X (p) = Inf
{
x ∈ R, FυX (x) ≥ p
}
.
Again, one gets Fυ
−1
X (0) = −∞, Fυ−1X (1) = Maxs∈S X(s), Fυ−1X is non-decreasing and left-continuous. Again Fυ−1X is
completely defined by its values on (0, 1).
From this, we deduce:
Theorem 1. ∀X ∈ RS :
∫
X dυ = ∫ 10 Fυ−1X (p)dp.
Proof. Let X = x1A∗1 + · · · + xiA∗i + · · · + xnA∗n, Ai ∈ A, partition of S, x1 < · · · < xi < · · · < xn. Let us denote
αi := υ(X ≤ xi). 7
It is straightforward to check that denoting α0 = 0, one gets Fυ−1X (p) = xi for p belonging to (αi−1,αi] for i = 1, . . . , n.
Therefore,writing F−1 insteadof Fυ−1X , for the sakeof simplicity, oneobtains:
∫ 1
0 F
−1(p)dp = ∫ α10 F−1(p)dp+
∫ α2
α1
F−1(p)dp+
· · · + ∫ αiαi−1 F−1(p)dp + · · · +
∫ αn
αn−1 F
−1(p)dp hence
∫ 1
0 F
−1(p)dp = x1(1 − υ(X > x1) + x2(υ(X > x1) − υ(X >
x2)) + · · · + xi(υ(X > xi−1) − υ(X > xi)) + · · · + xnυ(X > xn−1) so ∫ 10 F−1(p)dp =
∫
X dυ . 
Theorem 1 expresses the Choquet integral as an integral of an appropriate quantile function. In this way an inverse
cumulative function or a fat-tailed function is obtained. This composed inverse cumulative function is amenable to represent
pessimism and optimism on extreme outcomes and ambiguity neutrality on ordinary outcomes.
4. Precautionary principle as a rule of choice with optimism on the upper tail and pessimism on the lower tail
Thus, according to the assumption, the DM faces ambiguity modeled by a convex capacity υ , i.e., a capacity satisfying the
further requirement υ(A ∪ B) + υ(A ∩ B) ≥ υ(A) + υ(B), ∀A, B ∈ A.
From the previous developments, it turns out that the DM will fix what she conceives as the lower tail and the upper
tail, through her personal choice of α, β ∈ [0, 1], where α ≤ β , and therefore will compute the value of X ∈ RS through
I(X) = I1(X)+ I2(X)+ I3(X), where: I1(X) = ∫ α0 Fυ−1X (p)dp; I2(X) =
∫ β
α F
π−1
X (p)dp and I3(X) =
∫ 1
β F
υ−1
X (p)dp. It is worth
noting that I(X) = Eπ (X) if υ = π a probability; I(X) =
∫
X dυ if α = 1 and I(X) =
∫
X dυ if β = 0.
First, we need to check that I satisfies some minimal requirements of consistency, which are monotonicity, i.e., X ≥
Y 	⇒ I(X) ≥ I(Y), constant additivity, i.e., I(X + a.S∗) = I(X) + a, ∀a ∈ R and positive homogeneity, i.e., I(aX) = aI(X),
∀a ≥ 0 and ∀X .
7 Note that αn = 1.
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Proposition 2. I is monotone, constant additive and positively homogeneous.
Proof. Let us confine ourselves to checking monotonicity, constant additivity and positive homogeneity being straightfor-
ward. Let X ≥ Y , it is immediate that for any capacity υ , hence for any probability P, υ(Y ≤ t) ≥ υ(X ≤ t) ∀t since
X ≤ t 	⇒ Y ≤ t and υ is monotone, so FυX (t) ≤ FυY (t) ∀t, and consequently Fυ−1X (p) ≥ Fυ−1Y (p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore by
integrating w.r.t. p, one obtains I(X) ≥ I(Y). 
Let us determine the probability distribution π ∈ core(υ) that maximizes entropy. Jaffray [30] set that the natural
candidate was the probability distribution closer to uniformity "in particular the smallest elementary probability should
be as big as possible". Jaffray recursively defined a finite sequences of subsets in A, so that probabilities were attributed to
elementary events in an increasing order, and the maximum entropy probability was determined directly. 8
Once the unique probability π has been selected, it is possible to define the DM pessimism with respect to outcomes in
the lower tail and optimism with respect to outcomes in the upper tail. In fact, pessimism and optimism are defined with
respect to the probability distribution that expresses ambiguity neutrality, i.e. π .
Let us make these statements precise.
Definition 6. The DM is pessimistic with respect to the lower tail if she overestimates losses and underestimates gains in
this tail with respect to her most uniform probability π ∈ C(υ), i.e., if I1(X) ≤ ∫ α0 Fπ−1X (p)dp.
Definition 7. The DM is optimistic with respect to the upper tail if she underestimates losses and overestimates gains in
this tail with respect to her most uniform probability π ∈ C(υ), i.e., if I3(X) ≥ ∫ 1β Fπ−1X (p)dp.
Proposition 3. The DM is pessimistic with respect to the lower tail and optimistic with respect to the upper tail.
Proof. We just confine to prove the pessimistic side; the proof is similar for the optimistic one. Let p ∈ [0, 1] and recall
that Fυ
−1
X (p) = Inf
{
x ∈ R, 1 − υ(X > x) ≥ p
}
whereas Fπ
−1
X (p) = Inf
{
x ∈ R, 1 − π(X > x) ≥ p
}
. Since π belongs to
the core of υ , then π(X > x) ≥ υ(X > x), ∀x ∈ R; therefore, 1 − υ(X > x) ≥ 1 − π(X > x), ∀x ∈ R, and consequently
Fπ
−1
X (p) ≥ Fυ−1X (p), ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. Hence
∫ α
0 F
π−1
X (p)dp ≥
∫ α
0 F
υ−1
X (p)dp = I1(X). 
Proposition 3 shows that a DMwhowould value any act X through I(X), actually would exibit pessimismwith respect to
the lower tail and optimism with respect to the upper tail.
5. An application: the classical one-risky and one-safe asset portfolio problem
Let w > 0 be the initial deterministic wealth of the DM who may invest x ∈ [0,w] of her wealth in a risky investment
offering random returns R ∈ [−1,+∞) here R = {r1, . . . , ri, . . . , rn}, and r is the sure return, r ∈ R+.
The investor aims at maximizing f (x) = I(w − x(1 + r) + x(1 + R)) with x ∈ [0,w] or equally Max[0,w] f (x) =
I(w + x(R − r)). Note that f (x) = I(w + x(R − r)) = w + x(I(R) − r).
So clearly the DM will invest in the risky asset if and only if I(R) > r in which case, her optimal investment will be
x∗ = w.
Note that the investment decision does not need that Eπ (R) > r, similarly Eπ (R) > r will not imply that the DM will
invest in the risky asset.
This feature appears clearly in the particular example of Section 6 where π = P0 is the uniform distribution. Since
I(R) = 5r1
100
+ r6+···+r95
100
+ 5r100
100
one might have
∑
ri
100
< r but I(R) > r, this could occur if r1 = · · · = rn = 0; symmetrically
one might have
∑
ri
100
> r but I(R) < r.
Investing in the first case would be justified by an attracting asset with only positive returns and optimismw.r.t. windfall
gains, not investing in the second case would be justified by an asset offering too huge negative returns in the tail and
pessimism w.r.t. extreme losses.
8 To elicit π ∈ C(υ) consistent with the convex capacity υ , Jaffray considered the dual capacity υ . Starting with A0 = ∅, he recursively defined a family of
disjoint non-empty subsets Ak of S, where k ≥ 1, by: Ak ⊆ (A0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ak−1)c and υ(A0∪···∪Ak−1∪Ak)−υ(A0∪···∪Ak−1)|Ak | == Min
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
υ(A0∪···∪Ak−1∪E)−υ(A0∪···∪Ak−1)|E| ,
∅ = E ⊂ (A0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ak−1)c
⎫⎪⎬
⎪⎭.
Settingαk = υ(A0∪···∪Ak)−υ(A0∪···∪Ak−1)|Ak | , he proved that themaximumentropy probabilityπ in C(υ) is defined byπ({s}) = αk when s belongs to Ak , with indeed
k ≥ 1.
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6. Entropy maximization and E-contaminated probabilities
In Bayesian analysis, uncertainty in prior distribution can be modeled by using a class of E-contaminated probabilities,
where the parameter E ∈ [0, 1] indicates the probability deviation from the prior P0. Following some recent developments
of E-contamination approach under ambiguity in insurance, such as call spread with mixed regimes or insurance contract
with rare events [7,8,31], we consider the capacity υ obtained by the E-contamination of P0, such that υ(A) = (1− E)P0(A),∀A = S and E ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore under ambiguity we refer to E ∈ [0, 1] as the ambiguity attitude coefficient of the capacity
υ [9,25,38].
We first intend to show that for the particular convex case of E-contamination of a given probability P0, Jaffray’s algorithm
is particularly efficient since at most two steps are needed. This is illustrated in the next lemma.
Lemma. Let υ be the E-contamination of P0, and let π denote the maximum entropy probability in C(υ). If E = 0, π = P0;
if E = 1, π is the uniform distribution. Finally if E ∈ (0, 1), π is defined by: π ({s}) = υ(A1)|A1| , for any s ∈ A1, where
υ(A1)|A1| = Min
{
υ(E)
|E| ,∅ = E ⊆ S
}
(1), if A1 = S,π is therefore the uniform distribution; if Ac1 =∅ thenπ is furthermore defined
by π ({s}) = (1 − E)P0({s}), ∀s ∈ Ac1 (2). Note that υ(E)|E| = E +(1−E)P0(E)|E| for any ∅ = E ⊆ S.
Proof. If E = 0, υ = P0 hence clearly π = P0 since C(υ) = {P0}. If E = 1, C(υ) =
{
probability distributions on
(
S, 2S
)}
hence clearly the ’less diffuse’ probability i.e. the maximum entropy probability in C(υ) is the uniform distribution. 
Assume now that E ∈ (0, 1), therefore the first step of Jaffray’s algorithm leads to (1) (see Footnote 8). So if A1 = S,
π is completely determined in one step. Otherwise since for any ∅ = E ⊆ S, υ(E) = E +(1 − E)P0(E), it comes that
υ(A0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ak−1 ∪ E) − υ(A0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ak−1) = (1 − E)P0(E), ∀∅ = E ⊆ (A0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ak−1)c . Accordingly let us denote,
after relabeling if necessary, s1, . . . , si, . . . , sm the states of the world in A
c
1, where P0({s1}) ≤ P0({s2}) ≤ · · · ≤ P0({sm}),
then the direct application of Jaffray’s algorithm leads to (2).
For instanceapplying theprevious lemmaforS = {s1, . . . , si, . . . , s100},P0 definedbyP0({s1}) = · · · = P0({s50}) = 1200 ,
P0({s51}) = · · · = P0({s100}) = 3200 and E= 12 , one straightforwardly obtainedπ in one step, and thereforeπ is the uniform
distribution.
We now come to the entire treatment of an example.
Let S = {s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn} be the set of states of the world and assume a DM faces total ambiguity. In such a case,
the DM might apply the Laplace’s Principle of Insufficient Reason and model the prior as being the uniform distribution
P0 : P0({si}) = 1n , ∀i. Nevertheless the precautionary principle might lead her to envision the largest set of possible
probability measures defined by the convex capacity υ being a suitable E-contamination of P0.
Since, P0 ∈ C(υ) and P0 is the uniform distribution, it turns out that clearly the most uniform probability π in C(υ) is P0.
Let n = 100, E = 1
2
(so we consider a DM with a high level of ambiguity aversion, which will mean a high level of
pessimism with respect to the lower tail and a high level of optimism with respect to the upper tail), and where the lower
and upper tails are consistently defined, respectively, through α = 5
100
and β = 95
100
.
We furthermore consider X ∈ RS such that X(si) = xi with x1 < · · · < xi < · · · < xn.
Let us first compute I2(X).
Note that Fπ
−1
X (
i
100
) = xi for i ∈ [1, 100] and let us recall that Fπ−1X (.) is left-continuous. It comes that I2(X) =∫ 6%
5% x6dp + · · · +
∫ 95%
94% x95dp = x6+···+x95100 .
Let us now turn to the computation of I1(X).
Recall that FυX (x) = 1 − υ(X > x), ∀x ∈ R, so FυX (xi) = 1 − (1 − E) n−i100 for i ∈ [1, n].
Let us finally compute I3(X).
We have FυX (x) = υ(X ≤ x) = (1−E)P(X ≤ x), if x < xn; hence FυX (xi) = (1−E)i100 , if i < n so FυX (xi) ≥ 95100 ⇐⇒ i ≥ 190,
since i < 100, this is impossible, henceforth Fυ
−1
X (
95
100
) = xn and I3(X) = ∫ 100%95% xndp = 5xn100 .
One finally obtains:
I(X) = I1(X) + I2(X) + I3(X) = 5x1100 + x6+···+x95100 + 5x100100 .
Note that this formula might appear meaningful, since in this simple case, due to strong pessimism for the lower tail and
strong optimism for upper tail, the DM computes the value of X through the mathematical expectation of X with respect to
the uniform distribution, bymerely replacing outcomes in the lower tail with theworst outcome and outcomes in the upper
tail with the best outcome.
6.1. A simpler model
The efficient algorithm proposed by Jaffray [30] to obtain π ∈ C(υ) is general but not immediate, so we introduce a
simplified approach. Consider a credible probability measure P0 ∈ C(υ), and assume that the degree of pessimismwith the
lower tail is E1, while the degree of optimism with respect to the upper tail is E2.
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Therefore, denoting υ1 the E1-contamination of P0 and υ2 the E2-contamination of P0, one might value act X through:
I(X) = I1(X) + I2(X) + I3(X), where
I1(X) = ∫ α0 Fυ
−1
1
X (p)dp; I2(X) =
∫ β
α F
P
−1
0
X (p)dp and I3(X) =
∫ 1
β F
υ−12
X (p)dp.
It is straightforward to check that this new functional again satisfies the minimal requirement of monotonicity, constant
additivity and positive homogeneity.
Such a model would also allow the expression of asymmetric pessimism and optimism through, for instance, E1 ≥ E2.
In fact simultaneous different degrees of ambiguity attitude can be expressed by allowing more than one contamination so
that themodel becomesmore flexible [5]. It is worth noticing that the approach based on E-contaminated probabilities is not
as precise as the Jaffray’s algorithm, but our simple model can be interpreted as follow: (1− E1 − E2) captures the notion of
reliability of the chosen probability distribution P0 and E1 and E2 measure the error in the elicitation of P0 in C(υ), weighted
by the asymmetric ambiguity attitude with respect to extreme outcomes [5].
7. Concluding remarks
In thispaper,weshowarepresentation theoreminwhichaprospect is evaluatedbya functionaldefined throughquantiles.
We use a couple of quantiles that define an interval of events that the DM considers familiar, in some sense ordinary with
respect to her experimented life, and two tails that include extreme events, such as events with very small probabilities of
occurring and very large consequences either positive (windfall gains) or negative (catastrophic losses). In this way, we are
able to take into account both asymmetric attitude with respect to ambiguity on extreme events (optimism with respect to
windfall gains and pessimism with respect to catastrophic events) and the DM’s attitude considering entropy as a rule of
inference, when information is ambiguous and scanty.
Our approach originates a probability distribution on the possible consequences of a given act that has an interesting
shape: it is a platykurtic (fat-tailed) function. It is straightforward to extend our representation to financial markets where
phenomena such as implicit volatility smiles on stock options (volatility varies across state and time to maturity) are ex-
tensively documented and stock returns indicate that extreme losses and gains are significant and have high chances of
occurring [39].
In the spirit of some recent development of the decision theory under ambiguity, we introduce an alternative method to
define the composite value functionof a prospect basedon E-contaminationof probabilities, a basicmethodology inBayesian
robustness analysis. Finally, our representation theorem provides operational content to the precautionary principle by
defining a rank among alternative acts, which combines conservative and dissipative behavior with the application of the
principle of insufficient reason (one egg in each box), given the reliability of the probability distributions, and overcomes
the failure of the full conservative measure, e.g., maxmin decisional rule.
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